Employment Research Newsletter
Volume 29

Number 4

Article 3

11-1-2022

Employment Research, Vol. 29, No. 4, October 2022

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/empl_research

Citation
W.E. Upjohn Institute. 2022. Employment Research. 29(4). https://doi.org/10.17848/1075-8445.29(4)

This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org.

OCTOBER 2022 • VOL 29, NO 4

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n To boost college
graduation rates, policymakers
often advocate programs such
as coaching or mentoring, but
many of these programs are
costly and difficult to scale.
n We evaluate a relatively
low-cost (and potentially
scalable) group coaching
program targeted at first-year
college students who are placed
on academic probation.
n The program is mandatory,
and participants attend a
workshop in which coaches
aim to normalize failure and
improve self-confidence.
n We show that the program

raises students’ first-year
GPAs and decreases the
probability of their dropping
out in the first year of college.
n The coaching/mentoring
may have substantial longrun effects: we document
significant gains in lowerincome students’ earnings
7–9 years following entry
to the university.
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College Academic Coaching
Can Increase College Success
and Later Earnings
Pierre Mouganie, Serena Canaan, Stefanie Fischer, and Geofrey C. Schnorr
Te college wage premium—the additional
earnings of college graduates over high school
graduates—has increased in recent decades.
Although college graduation rates have also been
increasing recently, the disparity in graduation
rates between lower- and higher-income students
has been growing. Tis puts low-income students
at a disadvantage in the labor market. Policymakers
and researchers have recognized this issue, and an
ofen-proposed solution is to enhance academic
support services in both high schools and colleges
in order to improve college graduation rates,
particularly for groups that have traditionally
struggled.
Academic support services such as coaching
and mentoring programs have shown the most
promise, but only when they are implemented
in a very proactive manner—when they provide
students with personalized follow-up and attention.
Unfortunately, these programs are ofen expensive,
making them hard to implement or scale at a
regional or national level. We analyze a relatively
low-cost but targeted-group coaching program
that has the potential to scale. Tis program was
rolled out at a large public university in California
starting in the year 2009. Te program targeted
frst-year students most at risk of dropping out—
those placed on academic probation during their
frst semester at university.
We fnd that the coaching program signifcantly
increased students’ frst year grade-point average
by 16 percent of a standard deviation (about 0.1
GPA points on a 4.0-point scale) and lowered frstyear dropout rates by 8.6 percentage points, from
approximately 26 to 18 percent. We also fnd that
these changes correspond to a higher likelihood
of graduating from university. Tese efects seem
to be concentrated among men, STEM majors,

and lower-income student groups. Tis pattern
is not surprising, as lower-income students and
men persist in and complete college at much lower

An academic-support coaching
program at a large California
university signifcantly increased
at-risk students’ frst-year GPAs while
lowering dropout rates from 26
percent to 18 percent.
rates than higher-income students and women.
Additionally, college attrition rates for STEM
majors tend to be high.
In a recent paper, we also provide some of
the frst causal evidence that coaching and/or
mentoring programs can lead to signifcant gains
in the labor market. While we fnd that coaching
had no overall efect on employment and wages, we
do document substantial wage gains for men and
lower-income students. Our fndings are timely
and relevant, as policymakers and researchers aim
to address the college “completion crisis” in the
United States.
Measuring the Impact of the Targeted Academic
Coaching Program
Using rich administrative data for all frstyear students entering a large public university in
the state of California, our approach centers on
understanding the efects of targeted coaching
programs for academically vulnerable students.
Specifcally, we use student-level data for 11
cohorts of students entering the university
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between 2007 and 2017. By linking
these data to administrative fles from
the state of California’s Employment
Development Department, we are able
to also investigate the program’s efect
on students’ eventual labor market
outcomes.

The college benefts of the program
were concentrated among groups
typically with lower college
graduation rates: lower-income
students, men, and STEM majors.
Our data and setting are ideal for
our analysis for three reasons. First,
the way the coaching program was
rolled out at the university we examine
provides an ideal way to establish
a causal link between the program
and students’ outcomes. We touch
on this point in more detail below.
Second, the structure of the program
is interesting in that it has many of
the key components of previously
successful programs but without the
added costs. Indeed, the program
rollout was targeted at academically
vulnerable students, involved personal
supervision, required follow-up visits,
and was mandatory. We estimate
that the program cost of inducing
an additional student to remain at
university is $1,667. Tird, our data
are both detailed and extensive,
spanning many years of individuals’
lives. Tis enables us to ofer a broad
look at potential outcomes through
various stages of life (early university,
graduation, labor market outcomes) to
try to understand why the program was
successful.
A complicating factor in estimating
the causal efects of any mentoring
program is that students generally
self-select into these programs. In
particular, students from higherincome households or those with more
parental involvement may be more
likely to take up these opportunities.
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As a result, simply comparing students
who are mentored to those who are not
confates the causal efect of mentoring
with the type of student who selects
into mentoring. In order to estimate
the causal impact of the program,
we take advantage of the frst-year
GPA eligibility criterion. Specifcally,
students scoring below a 2.0 GPA in
their frst semester were required to
participate in the coaching program,
and those scoring above it were not.
By comparing students who were just
below and just above the threshold,
we are able to estimate the causal
impact of the program, as students
around this threshold tend to have, on
average, similar characteristics and are
academically comparable.
A fnal complicating factor is that
the coaching eligibility GPA threshold
of 2.0 is the same as the probation
threshold at the university. In other
words, students scoring below a 2.0
GPA in their frst semester are required
to attend the coaching program but
are also placed on academic probation.
Luckily, we have data for three years
prior to the rollout of the program.
In these years, students below the
program threshold were put on
probation but were not required to
attend a coaching program. Intuitively,
our research involves estimating the
efects of scoring below versus above
the 2.0 GPA cutof for cohorts exposed
to both coaching and probation,
relative to the efect of scoring below
versus above the 2.0 GPA cutof for
cohorts exposed to only probation.
Te results are striking. We fnd
that the coaching program increased
students’ GPAs by approximately 0.1
points and led to large reductions
in frst-year college dropouts on the
order of 8.6 percentage points, a 33
percent decrease. We also provide
evidence that the program increased
six-year graduation rates among
program participants by around 4 to
7 percentage points. Importantly, we
are also able to check whether these
impacts endure past graduation by

examining labor market outcomes.
Overall, we fnd no signifcant efects of
the coaching program on the average
student’s earnings and employment at
ages 24 to 26.
Our analysis reveals some
interesting patterns that are further
relevant for policymakers. Te majority
of the efects we estimate, for example,
are driven by lower-income students,
men, and students in STEM majors.
Figure 1 summarizes efect sizes for
these groups for three main outcomes
of interest: GPA, frst-year college
dropout rates, and quarterly earnings.
Even though we found no overall
impact on earnings for the average
student in the coaching program, we
do fnd large and signifcant efects
on earnings for these three groups of
students. In particular, low-income
students had approximately 30 percent
higher earnings at ages 24 to 26 as a
result of program participation.
Why Did Students Beneft So Much
from Academic Coaching?
Te detail of our data allows us
to speculate on why the coaching
program was so successful. While the
program was designed as a coaching
intervention, it includes a bundle of
treatments (i.e., emotional support,
information, goal-setting, and time
management skills) which all have the
potential to individually boost students’
academic success. Further analysis
from student surveys conducted at
the university shows that students
who participated in the program felt
signifcantly more supported by a
faculty or staf member, were less likely
to feel that they were the only ones
struggling, were more familiar with
the university’s student services, and
were better at managing their time.
Given these fndings, we believe that
the coaching program was successful
because it increased participants’
social-emotional state. Most
importantly, it seems to have increased
students’ perceptions regarding the
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level of support they felt from the
university.
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Figure 1 Efects of the Coaching Program on Low-Income Students, Males, and STEM Majors
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A fnal consideration is the
nature of the program we analyze.
Traditionally, mentoring or coaching
programs have been expensive,
making them extremely difcult to
roll out or scale up. A particularly
attractive and important feature of
our program is that it has a much
lower cost structure than previously
successful interventions. We estimate
that the program cost of inducing
an additional student to remain at
university is $1,667. Tis compares
favorably to other successful college
coaching programs, which can cost
anywhere from $4,000 to $19,000 per
student induced to stay at university.
From a policy perspective, our
program’s lower cost and less complex
structure make it potentially easy to
implement and scale at a larger level.
While the degree to which our fndings
can be replicated at other universities
remains an open question, the results
from this coaching program are quite
promising. We conclude that even
less-proactive coaching programs can
prove successful as long as they are
personalized, mandatory, and include
follow-up visits.
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For additional details, see the full working paper at
https://research.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/370/.
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NOTE: The fgure shows estimated efects of participation in the coaching program on the indicated outcome
for each of three groups: low-income students, male students, and students majoring in STEM felds. For
methodological details and full defnitions of the outcomes and groups, please see the full paper.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from administrative data from the state of California.
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Disability Insurance
Screening and Workers’
Health and Labor Market
Outcomes
Alexander Ahammer and Analisa Packham
Disability insurance (DI) is a public
expenditure (or social insurance)
program designed to provide income
to individuals who become incapable
of working due to health conditions,
ofen a workplace injury. Depending
on the income replacement rate, DI
can provide incentives against work
and can efectively serve as a form of
early retirement. Moreover, DI costs
and caseloads have been increasing in
recent years, leading governments to
consider alternative payment schemes
and/or additional restrictions.
Although more efective
gatekeeping can lower DI rolls and
reduce fnancial burdens, the costs
to workers themselves may be large.
For example, stricter DI screening
rules would be harmful to workers if
rejected applicants are forced to return
to work but experience lifelong mental
or physical health problems as a result.
On the other hand, if more stringent
criteria for claiming DI induces
workers “on the margin” to continue
working without sufering any negative
health consequences, applicants who

are screened out of eligibility would
continue to earn income.
To study these trade-ofs of stricter
DI screening directly, we use newly
linked administrative data in Austria
to evaluate whether changing agebased DI screening requirements
for older workers afects their labor
market outcomes, health, and wellbeing. While it is well documented that
DI can afect employment, we know
relatively little about how DI regulation
afects health in the short or long run.
We provide three new fndings:
First, we show that looser screening
regulations subsidize retirement by
inducing injured workers to claim
DI and permanently leave the labor
force. Next, we show that individuals
denied DI do not change their take-up
of other types of safety net program
participation, such as unemployment
insurance and sick leave. Lastly, and
most importantly, we show that being
denied DI does not lead to measurable
changes in mental or physical health.
Specifcally, screened-out workers
are no more likely to use opioids or

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n As DI caseloads rise, one relevant policy question is whether more targeted screening can reduce costs without imposing substantial health consequences.
n We find that looser DI screening regulations lead acutely injured workers aged
55–62 to claim DI and permanently leave the labor force.
n In contrast, implementing more stringent DI application criteria does not significantly increase mental or physical health costs for screened out workers.
n More targeted DI programs can have large fiscal savings without harming workers.
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antidepressant prescriptions, and they
do not experience additional hospital
stays or physician fees. Tese workers
are also no more likely to experience
a workplace reinjury. Governments
looking to reduce DI fnancial burdens
can thus consider tightening the
screening for eligibility to curb costs
without imposing signifcant physical
or mental harm to marginal applicants.
Efects of Increased DI Screening on
Labor Market Outcomes
Our goal is to measure how moretargeted DI programs afect worker
employment and health outcomes.
However, because DI is a program that
individuals can opt into and is based
on health assessments from a doctor,
workers claiming DI and those unable
to claim DI are likely diferent on many
dimensions, like age or health status.
Terefore, to get a sense of the causal
efects of changes in DI screening, we
use a natural experiment that allows us
to defne treatment and control cohorts
to test the diferences of increased DI
screening.
To compare otherwise similar
workers who face diferent levels of
DI screening, we exploit changes in
the Austrian Generous Screening Age
(GSA) over time. For younger workers
below the GSA, screening for DI is
relatively strict, requiring a 50 percent
reduced earnings capacity relative to
any occupation the individual could
pursue. At the GSA, the screening
criteria are more relaxed, requiring a
50 percent reduced earnings capacity
relative to the individual’s last
occupation. Until the end of 2012, the
GSA was 57. However, in 2013, as part
of the Stability Act, or Stabilitätsgesetz,
Austria reformed these age-based
screening requirements, slowly
increasing the GSA from 57 to 60 over
three years, making it more difcult for
older workers to access DI benefts.
We focus on the subset of applicants
at most immediate need of DI: acutely
injured workers. We analyze efects
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participation does not simply spill over
to other government programs; we
fnd that workers subject to stricter DI
screening are no more likely to claim
unemployment insurance in the frst
two years afer injury.
Additionally, we show that prior to
a work accident, workers facing both
tight and relaxed screening criteria
have similar levels of daily wages
(approximately 90 euros per day).
However, our estimates indicate that
workers facing stricter DI screening
are not only more likely to reenter the
workforce, but they also experience
higher earnings trajectories and earn
approximately 2,075 more euros per
year, on average.
Efects of Increased DI Screening on
Worker Health Outcomes
Next, we analyze the broader efects
of increasing DI screening. Specifcally,

we test whether screening out more
workers afects short- or long-run
physical and mental health outcomes.
We fnd that the number of days spent

We fnd that stronger DI screening
increases employment by 20.0
percentage points in the 12 quarters
after a workplace accident—this
corresponds in our sample to an
additional 470 workers staying in
the labor market who would have
otherwise retired within three years.
in the hospital for workers facing tight
screening and those facing generous
screening almost perfectly overlap,
both prior to and afer a workplace
accident. In the quarter of the accident,
hospital days spike, suggesting that

Figure 1 Efects of Increased DI Screening on the Probability of Being Employed
1.1
1.0
Probability of being employed

of the change in DI screening for
male workers aged 55–62, comparing
same-age workers who experienced a
workplace accident between 2000 and
2017. Workplace accidents represent
an unexpected acute health care shock
to workers and result in DI claims
approximately 20 percent of the time.
We separate workers into two
groups: those subject to a “tight” (more
restrictive) screening requirement afer
injury and those subject to relaxed
screening, according to the GSA rule
and the worker’s age at the time of the
accident. We fnd that afer a worker
experiences an accident, DI claims
increase in both groups. However,
the increase in DI claims is markedly
smaller for workers who qualify for
stricter screening. In particular, we fnd
that stricter DI application screening
leads to a 7.8 percentage point decrease
in DI take-up, on average. We show
that this decrease is not due to workers
waiting until they are older to claim DI
or experiencing more accidents once
they are past the GSA cutof.
In Figure 1 we perform the same
exercise for the probability of being
employed. Prior to a workplace
accident, the trends in employment
for the workers subject to tight versus
generous DI screening overlap. Afer
the accident, workers in both groups
are more likely to leave the labor
market. However, the outfow is much
weaker among those who are subject to
stricter DI screening.
When we formally estimate the
causal impact of tighter screening
laws by comparing workers based
on their screening level prior to and
afer the workplace accident, we fnd
that stronger DI screening increases
employment by 20.0 percentage points
in the 12 quarters afer a workplace
accident—this corresponds in our
sample to an additional 470 workers
staying in the labor market who
otherwise would have retired within
three years. Notably, this is almost
identical to the magnitude for the
take-up in DI. Tis reduction in DI
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NOTE: The sample includes all male workers that have a work accident aged 55–62 between 2000 and
2017, N = 6,394. The fgure plots raw probabilities for each quarter relative to the work accident.
SOURCE: Individual-level data on workplace accidents is from the Austrian General Accident Insurance
Fund. Data on DI enrollment and labor market participation and wages for Austrian workers is from the
Austrian Social Security Database fles.
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the two groups before and afer a
workplace accident and mirrors the
trends for other health outcomes that
we observe. We fnd no diferential
efects on physician fees or reinjury,
implying that workers screened out
of DI are no more likely to experience
further negative physical health
consequences when returning to work.
To test for efects on mental health,
such as stress or depression, we analyze
changes in prescription take-up for
antidepressants and antidementia
drugs. We fnd no statistically
signifcant efects for either measure.
Tese fndings further reinforce the
notion that, for marginal applicants, DI
subsidizes retirement but yields little to
no health benefts.

the accident leads to around a weeklong hospital stay on average for both
groups. Afer the accident, the trends
converge again. (Formally, we fnd that

We fnd no diferential efects on
physician fees or reinjury, implying
that screened out workers are
no more likely to experience further
negative health consequences
when returning to work.
tighter DI screening leads to a small,
economically insignifcant 0.2 day
increase in average hospital stays.)
Furthermore, to examine whether
increased screening forces workers to
return to work without a full recovery,
we analyze two other measures of
health care utilization: fees paid
to physicians and reinjury. Figure
2 presents the trends in injury for

Measuring Welfare Efects
Taking the above fndings into
consideration, we ask whether the
social benefts of the changes in DI

Figure 2 Efects of Increased DI Screening on the Probability of Reinjury
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NOTE: The sample includes all Upper Austrian male workers who have a work accident aged 55–62 between 2000
and 2017 (N = 645). The fgure plots raw probabilities for each quarter relative to the work accident.
SOURCE: Individual-level data on workplace accidents is from the Austrian General Accident Insurance Fund.
Data on DI enrollment and labor market participation and wages for Austrian workers is from the Austrian Social
Security Database fles.
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screening outweigh the costs. Consider
what would happen if the stricter
screening were not implemented,
and more workers instead were able
to claim DI. Using our estimates, we
calculate the benefts of being subject to
a less-strict eligibility criteria, including
any gained income and health efects
for the marginal workers. We then
consider the direct government costs of
looser DI screening, including forgone
tax revenue.
We fnd that only 20 percent of male
workers aged 55–62 injured on the job
claim DI within three years of injury,
corresponding to approximately 4,700
workers. To estimate direct impacts to
worker well-being, we consider how
DI take-up changes income. Because
DI has, on average, a 70 percent
replacement rate aggregating foregone
income across these 4,700 workers
implies that, in total, workers are
willing to trade approximately nearly
1 million euros per year for reduced
DI screening. Because the change
in screening does not afect health
outcomes or unemployment insurance
receipt, workers do not directly beneft
on these dimensions.
Next, we calculate the net DI
cost per recipient for workers near
the margin. Workers eligible for DI
remain on the program as a form of
retirement. We estimate that workers
claiming DI afer an on-the-job injury
receive an average payment of nearly
17,000 euros annually. Terefore, the
mechanical reduction in costs for
increasing DI screening equals about
2.6 million euros per year (17,000
euros × 470 cases / three years).
Furthermore, when workers receive
DI and leave their job, the government
loses tax revenue. Assuming the lowest
marginal tax rate bracket in Austria
of 20 percent, and the average wage in
our sample of about 24,000 euros, we
should expect that the government will
give up an average of 750,000 euros
each year in tax revenue from more
generous DI screening.
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Conclusion
We fnd that, in Austria, tightening
the screening standards for DI provides
fscal benefts with minimal health
and labor market consequences for
the marginal worker. If such a policy
were to be targeted to younger and/
or healthier workers who would be
expected to continue to work for many
more years, welfare gains would be
even larger. We note that the implicit
price of providing DI benefts to
applicants, in terms of impacts on
the labor market, has been shown
to be larger in Austria than in the
United States. Tis is mostly due to
the fact that DI in the United States
is ofen seen as a program that can
serve as a substitute to unemployment
insurance or other non-health shocks.
Terefore, our fndings may be most
relevant for countries with relatively
large social safety nets. Nonetheless,
the conclusions from our analysis are
generally relevant for governments
(like the United States) that still rely
on age-based DI policies. Overall,
these fndings are especially relevant
for governments looking to reduce the
rising fscal costs of disability payments
without inducing lifelong health
consequences for workers.

Alexander Ahammer is an assistant professor of
economics at Johannes Kepler University Linz.
Analisa Packham is an assistant professor of
economics at Vanderbilt University and a faculty
research fellow at the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
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“Despite its ubiquity, occupational licensing received almost no scrutiny—until Kleiner alerted scholars
and policymakers to its importance. Now, Kleiner and coeditor Koumenta 'go global' with this volume,
illuminating the positives and pitfalls of occupational licensing across Europe and the U.S. Their book is
indispensable reading for practitioners, policymakers, and egghead labor economists like me.”
–David Autor, Ford Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“Regulating labor markets through occupational licensing could
help increase service quality but is likely to also reduce labor
supply and increase prices. This fascinating book examines many
occupations across fve countries and shows that there is no
clear positive impact of licensing on quality. It is a must read for
everyone interested in the practical impact of regulation —as
well as those seeking reforms.”
–John Van Reenen, Ronald Coase Professor of Economics, London
School of Economics and Digital Fellow, MIT
"Grease or Grit is an engaging crash course on the licensing
landscape. The book is an accessible but thorough exploration
of an important labor market institution that has so far been
poorly understood. It helps fll multiple information vacuums
that policymakers have had to operate in and is required reading for anybody who wants a better
understanding of how public policy and labor markets intersect."
–Mischa Fisher, Chief Economist, Angi.com
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